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A QUESTION OF NECESSITY: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION AND A STATE'S USE OF CLOSEDCIRCUIT TELEVISION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
CASES
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
right of a criminal defendant to confront adverse witnesses.' The United

States Supreme Court has held that the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment secures for a criminal defendant the opportunity physically to

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 2 The Supreme Court has
determined that the confrontation clause functions to promote the reliability
of the truth-finding process in criminal trials and, therefore, is vital to the
defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. 3 The Court has emphasized that

1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The sixth, amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." Id.
2. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (stating that sixth amendment
right to confrontation includes the right to physical confrontation and cross-examination). In
Kirby the United States government charged the defendant, Kirby, with feloniously receiving
and possessing stolen postage stamps. Id. at 47-49. At Kirby's trial the government, pursuant
to a congressional act, presented as evidence the convictions of three individuals whom the
state charged with stealing the postage stamps to show that Kirby possessed stolen United
States' property. Id. at 49. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant. Id. at 53.
On appeal the United States Supreme Court in Kirby held that the trial court erred in
admitting the records of conviction of the principals. Id. at 54. The Supreme Court in Kirby
noted that Kirby did not have the opportunity to participate in the proceedings that resulted
in the principals' convictions. Id. Accordingly, the Kirby Court determined that the act of
Congress which provided that the government may use a principal's conviction as conclusive
proof that the property at issue was stolen, violated the sixth amendment right to confrontation.
Id. at 54-64. The Supreme Court in Kirby reasoned that the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment entitles the accused physically to confront and cross-examine all witnesses who
provide evidence against the accused. Id. at 55. The Court explained that because Kirby had
neither the opportunity to cross-examine the two principals on the principals' pleas of guilty,
nor the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testified for the government at the
third principal's trial, the government violated the confrontation clause by submitting the
principals' records of conviction as evidence that Kirby received and possessed stolen property.
Id. at 54-64. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed Kirby's conviction. Id. at 64; see
Pointer .v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1965) (stating that sixth amendment confrontation
clause includes right to confrontation and cross-examination). In Pointer the United States
Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution made
the sixth amendment right to confrontation obligatory on the states. Id. at 403; see also
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (stating that sixth amendment confrontation
clause entitles accused physically to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (same); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95
(1973) (same).
3. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (stating that right to
confrontation and cross-examination enables jury to determine truth of witness' testimony).
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confrontation and cross-examination ensure the integrity of the jury's factual
determinations by enabling the jury to observe a witness's demeanor and,
4
thereby, assess credibility.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the right to confront adverse
witnesses is fundamental to criminal due process, the Court also has
acknowledged exceptions to a defendant's right of confrontation. 5 For

In Mattox a jury in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas convicted the
defendant, Mattox, of murder. Id. at 237-38. Upon a writ of error, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
at 238. At the defendant's second trial the government introduced as evidence the court
reporter's notes of the testimony of two government witnesses who testified at the former trial
and who since had died. Id. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of murder. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the defendant's conviction.
Id. at 250. In Mattox the Supreme Court determined that the sixth amendment right to
confrontation and cross-examination enables the jury to observe a witness' demeanor and,
thereby, determine the credibility of the witness' testimony. Id. at 242-43. In holding that the
confrontation clause did not prohibit the government's use of the deceased witnesses' prior in
court testimony, the Mattox Court reasoned that the defendant had the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the deceased witnesses at the defendant's initial trial. Id. at 244. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in Mattox explained that the confrontation clause should not require that
the Court undermine the safety of the public by allowing a defendant to escape prosecution
simply due to a witness' death. Id. at 243. Because Mattox had the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the deceased witnesses at Mattox's initial trial and, therefore, the jury at
the first trial had the opportunity to assess the witnesses' credibility, the Mattox Court held
that the government's presentation of the deceased witnesses' testimony at the defendant's
second trial did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. Id. at
242-44; see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (noting that confrontation and crossexamination provide jury with means to assess truth of witness' testimony); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 4009 405 (1965) (stating that right of confrontation and cross-examination is essential
to defendant's ability to receive fair trial); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736
(1987) (stating that confrontation rights promote reliability of truth-finding process in criminal
trials); Lee v. Illinois 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (same).
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases explaining
that confrontation rights provide jury with means to determine truth of witness' testimony).
5. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (stating that right to confrontation and cross-examination are not absolute). In Chambers v. Mississippi the State of
Mississippi charged the defendant, Chambers, with murder. Id. at 287. Prior to Chambers'
trial, another individual, Gable McDonald, gave a sworn confession to Chambers' attorneys
that he, McDonald, had committed the murder. Id. The local police authorities subsequently
arrested McDonald. Id. at 283. At a preliminary hearing one month later McDonald repudiated
his confession to the murder. Id. Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting that the court
order McDonald to appear. Id. at 291. Chambers also requested that, if the State chose not
to call McDonald, the court allow Chambers to call McDonald as an adverse witness. Id. The
trial court granted Chambers' motion that required McDonald to appear but reserved ruling
on Chambers' adverse witness motion. Id. At Chambers' trial, the State did not call McDonald
to the stand. Id. Chambers called McDonald and presented McDonald's sworn confession to
the jury. Id. Upon cross-examination of McDonald, the State elicited McDonald's repudiation
of the confession. Id. After the State's cross-examination of McDonald, Chambers renewed
the motion to examine McDonald as an adverse witness. Id. The trial court, holding that
McDonald was not an adverse witness, denied the motion. Id. Chambers subsequently sought
to introduce the testimony of three witnesses to whom McDonald had confessed to the murder.
Id. at 292. The State objected to the admission of the three witnesses' testimony on the ground
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example, the Supreme Court has held that, although the confrontation
clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right physically to face adverse
witnesses, a trial court may remove from the courtroom a defendant who
engages in disruptive behavior during trial. 6 In addition to holding that a

that the testimony constituted hearsay evidence. Id. at 292-93. The trial court sustained the
State's objections. Id.
On appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's rulings. Id. at 291,
293. In Chambers the United States Supreme Court observed that the sixth amendment right
to confrontation and cross-examination is essential to due process. Id. at 294. The Court,
however, also observed that the defendant's rights to confrontation and cross-examination are
not absolute and in appropriate cases may bow to other legitimate interests. Id. at 295. The
Chambers Court explained that a state's abrogation or significant impairment of the accused's
confrontation rights to further other important interests implicates the accuracy of the truthdetermining process and, therefore, requires searching judicial scrutiny into the adequacy of
the competing interest. Id. The Supreme Court in Chambers concluded that the trial court's
ruling, which was in accordance with a Mississippi rule that a party may not impeach its own
witness and which refused Chambers the opportunity to cross-examine McDonald, violated the
defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 294-98. The Chambers Court
reasoned that the Mississippi rule potentially could undermine the accuracy of the truthfinding
process and, in Chamber's case, impaired the defendant's ability to defend against the State's
charges. Id. at 296. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction. Id.
at 303; see Bourjaly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (stating that confrontation
clause does not bar introduction of all out of court statements); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 63-65 (1980) (holding that confrontation clause does not prohibit introduction of hearsay
evidence under certain circumstances); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970) (same); supra
note 3 (discussing Supreme Court's determination in Mattox that government's introduction
of deceased witnesses' prior testimony did not violate confrontation clause of sixth amendment).
6. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (holding that defendant who engages
in disruptive behavior can lose right to be present at trial). In Allen the State of Illinois
charged the defendant, Allen, with armed robbery. Id. At the defendant's trial the defendant
behaved in an extremely abusive and disruptive manner. Id. at 339-41. Allen argued with the
trial judge and continuously interrupted the proceedings. Id. Despite a warning from the trial
court, the defendant continued to behave disruptively and the court ordered that the trial
proceed in the defendant's absence. Id. Allen remained out of the courtroom during the State's
presentation of its case. Id. at 341. Following Allen's assurances that he would not disrupt
the trial, the trial court permitted the defendant to be present for the remainder of the trial.
Id. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant. Id. at 338.
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed Allen's conviction. People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d
167, 173, 226 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1967). Alleging that the trial court unconstitutionally had deprived
the defendant of the right to remain present throughout the trial, Allen filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Allen v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 337, 339 (1970). The
district court found no constitutional violation and refused to issue the writ. Id. The defendant
appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Illinois v. Allen, 413 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1969). The Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that because Allen's sixth amendment right to be present at trial was absolute, the
trial court unconstitutionally removed Allen from the courtroom. Id.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the trial court's expulsion of the defendant from
the courtroom did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-47.
Although acknowledging that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees an
accused the right to be present at every stage of trial, the Allen Court concluded that the
defendant in Allen had forfeited the right to be present. Id. The Court reasoned that the
confrontation clause should not prevent a judge from employing whatever means necessary to
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defendant who disrupts courtroom procedure may forfeit the right to

confront an adverse witness, the Court also has determined that a court's
admission of certain hearsay evidence, such as a co-conspirator's out of
court statements, similarly does not violate a defendant's sixth amendment right physically to confront an adverse witness. 7 Recently, in Coy v.

maintain order in the courtroom. Id. The Allen Court explained that order in the courtroom
is vital to the proper administration of justice and, therefore, a trial court constitutionally
may remove from the courtroom a defendant whose conduct impairs the progress of a criminal
trial. Id. at 346. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Allen reversed the decision of the court
of appeals. Id. at 347.
7. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86-90 (1970) (holding that trial court's admission
of co-conspirators' out of court statement did not violate defendant's confrontation rights).
In Evans the State of Georgia charged the defendant, Evans, and two others, Wade Truett
and Venson Williams, with the murder of three police officers. Id. at 76. A Georgia grand
jury indicted Evans and Williams on the murder charges and the State granted Truett immunity
from prosecution in return for Truett's testimony. Id. At Evans' trial, Truett testified for the
prosecution and detailed the circumstances surrounding Evans' and Williams' murder of the
three officers. Id. at 77. In addition to Truett, nineteen other witnesses, including a man
named Shaw, testified for the prosecution. Id. Shaw testified that when Williams returned to
the penitentiary after arraignment, Shaw had asked Williams how he made out in court. Id.
Shaw stated that Williams had responded that but for Evans "we wouldn't be in this now."
Id. Defense counsel objected to the State's introduction of Shaw's testimony on the grounds
that the testimony was hearsay and, therefore, violated Evans' confrontation rights. Id. at 7778. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted Shaw's testimony on the basis of a
Georgia statute that allowed a court to admit a co-conspirator's extrajudicia statement that a
co-conspirator uttered during the stage of a criminal conspiracy when the conspirators are
attempting to conceal the conspirators' crime. Id. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant. Id. at 76.
On appeal the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the conviction. Id. at 78. Upon a writ of
habeas corpus the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside Evans' murder
conviction. Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 827 (5th Cir. 1968). The Fifth Circuit held that
the Georgia statute, which allowed a court to admit a co-conspirator's out of court statement
that the co-conspirator made when the perpetrators conspired to conceal both the crime and
the perpetrators' identity, unconstitutionally infringed on the defendant's confrontation rights.
Id.

On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 90. The Supreme Court in Dutton observed that a confrontation
issue arose because the prosecution intended the jury to infer from Shaw's testimony that
Williams' statement blaming the defendant for Williams' legal predicament implicitly identified
the defendant as the officers' murderer. Id. at 88. The Dutton Court, nevertheless, determined
that the trial court's admission of Shaw's testimony, pursuant to the Georgia statute, did not
violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront Williams. Id. The Supreme Court
in Dutton explained that the confrontation clause operates to insure the accuracy of the
truthfinding process in criminal trials by assuring that the jury has an adequate means for
determining the truth of a witness' prior statement. Id. at 89. The Dutton Court observed
that although the defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Williams regarding
Williams' statement to Shaw, the defendant did exercise his constitutional right to confront
Shaw on whether Shaw actually had heard Williams make the statement to which Shaw
testified. Id. The Supreme Court in Dutton concluded that the confrontation clause considers
a witness who is under oath and subject to cross-examination in the jury's presence a reliable
informant concerning what the witness has seen and has heard. Id. at 88. Furthermore, the
Dutton Court determined that Williams' statement was reliable because the statement was
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Iowa," the Supreme Court indicated in dicta that another exception to a
defendant's sixth amendment right physically to confront adverse witnesses
may exist if a court makes a case-specific determination that the court needs
to protect a particular witness. 9 The Court's dicta in Coy suggests the
constitutionality of many state statutes that allow a state, upon a trial
court's individualized finding that a particular witness requires protective
trial procedures, to use closed-circuit television to permit child sexual abuse
victims to testify outside of the accused's presence.10
In Coy the State of Iowa charged the defendant, Coy, with two counts
of lascivious acts with a child." Prior to the child victims' trial testimony,
the state court approved, pursuant to an Iowa statute, the State's placement
of a large screen between the witnesses and the defendant.' 2 The screen
enabled the defendant to see the witnesses but shielded the defendant from
the witnesses' view.' 3 Arguing that the procedure violated the defendant's
sixth amendment right to confrontation, Coy objected to the State's use of
the screen. 14 The trial court rejected Coy's constitutional claim and the jury
subsequently convicted the defendant.' 5

spontaneous and against Williams' penal interests. Id. at 89. The Supreme Court in Dutton
concluded that because the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Shaw on the issue
of whether Shaw actually heard Williams make the statement, and Williams' statement bore
a sufficient indicia of reliability, the trial court's admission of Shaw's testimony, pursuant to
the Georgia statute, did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights. Id. at 88-89; see
Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987) (holding that trial court's admission
of co-conspirators' out of court statements did not violate defendant's sixth amendment
confrontation rights); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 61-77 (1979) (finding that trial
court's admission of unavailable witness' preliminary hearing testimony did not violate defendant's confrontation rights).
8. 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988).
9. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988).
10. Id.; see infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text (discussing that Coy decision
indicates that statutes which provide for state's use of closed-circuit television may be constitutional).
11. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2799. In Coy the State of Iowa charged the defendant, Coy, with
sexually assaulting two thirteen year old girls while the girls were camping in the back yard
of a house next door to Coy's. Id.
12. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2799; see IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987) (permitting child abuse
victims to testify through closed-circuit television or from behind screen). The Iowa statute in
Coy provided that the trial court, on its motion, or any party's motion could order that a
child witness testify by closed-circuit television in a room other than the courtroom or from
behind a screen in the courtroom. IOWA CODE § 910A.14(1). The statute further provided that
if a child testified in a separate room via closed-circuit television the court could have required
that the defendant view the testimony from a room separate from the room in which the child
was testifying. Id.
13. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
14. Id. In Coy the defendant argued that the confrontation clause guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses and, therefore, the
State's use of a screen blocking the defendant from the witnesses' view violated the sixth
amendment. Id.
15. Id. In Coy the defendant also argued that the State's use of the screen made the
defendant appear guilty and, therefore, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
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On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction.16 Coy appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed
the judgment of the Iowa Court. 17 In holding that the State's placement of
a screen between the defendant and witnesses at trial violated the defendant's
confrontation rights, the United States Supreme Court in Coy stressed that
the sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees a criminal defendant
a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses.' 8 The Coy Court explained
that the right physically to confront adverse witnesses is fundamental to the
defendant's ability to receive a fair trial because a witness who faces the
accused is more likely to testify truthfully. 9 The Supreme Court in Coy,
therefore, determined that a defendant's right physically to confront a
witness, much like a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness, insures
the integrity of the truthfinding process in criminal trials. 20 Accordingly,
the Coy Court held that the State's placement of the screen between Coy
and the child witnesses, pursuant to the Iowa statute, impermissibly impinged
2
upon the defendant's confrontation rights. '
After concluding that the State's use of the screen violated the defendant's right to confront the child witnesses, the Supreme Court in Coy
rejected the State's claim that the State's interest in protecting the child
abuse victims outweighed the defendant's confrontation rights. 22 The Coy
Court observed that, although sixth amendment confrontation rights have,
in appropriate cases, given way to other important interests, 21 the State's
interest in protecting child abuse victims could not outweigh the defendant's

amendment. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that state shall not deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). Although the trial court
rejected Coy's due process claim, the trial court instructed the jury to draw no inference of
-guilt from the State's use of the screen. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2799-800.
16. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2800. The Iowa Supreme Court in Coy rejected the defendant's
confrontation argument reasoning that, because the screen did not impair Coy's ability to
cross-examine the witnesses, the State's use of the screen did not violate the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment. Id.
17. Id. at 2800-03.
18. Id.at 2800.
19. Id.at 2801-02.
20. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2801-02. In Coy the Supreme Court conceded that the confrontation clause does not compel a witness to look at the defendant. Id. at 2802. The Coy Court
observed, however, that, if a witness avoids looking at the defendant, the jury can make an
informed assessment of the witness' credibility. Id.
21. Id.at 2802-03.
22. Id.

23. Id. The Coy court observed that although the Court in previous cases acknowledged
that a defendant's confrontation rights have exceptions, the rights in previous cases did not
include the explicit right to a face-to-face confrontation, but rather, included rights that the
Court found implicit in the confrontation clause, such as the right to cross-examination and
the right to exclude out of court statements. Id. at 2802; see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
63-65 (1980) (observing that competing interest may outweigh confrontation rights and warrant
trial court's admission of unavailable witness' out of court statements); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1972) (noting that right to cross-examine witness may in appropriate cases
give way to other interests).
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sixth amendment right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses. 24

The Supreme Court in Coy explained that the state's abrogation of the
right to face-to-face confrontation required a more particularized showing
of necessity than Iowa's broad legislative determination that a particular
class of witnesses require protective trial procedures. 25 Because the Iowa

statute did not provide that a court make an individualized determination
that a particular child witness required protective trial procedures, the
Supreme Court in Coy held that the state constitutionally could not place
26
a screen between the defendant and the child witnesses.

Concurring in Coy, Justice O'Connor stated that in an appropriate case
the state's implementation of procedural devices to protect child witnesses
might pass constitutional muster. 27 The concurrence in Coy noted that
numerous state legislatures have enacted statutes that shield child sexual
abuse victims from the trauma of in court testimony. 2 Although recognizing

24. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. The Supreme Court observed that the Iowa statute in Coy
established a presumption that all child witnesses in sexual abuse cases would suffer trauma
if the state required that the child testify in the presence of the accused. Id. The Coy Court
concluded that the Iowa statute's presumption that all child abuse victims require protective
trial procedures never could pass constitutional muster. Id. The Court reasoned that exceptions
to confrontation rights not firmly established in American jurisprudence need something more
than a state statute's generalized determination that a particular class of witnesses needs special
treatment. Id.; see Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987) (finding coconspirator exception to hearsay rule firmly rooted in jurisprudence). The Coy Court concluded
that the State's use of a screen to block a defendant from the witnesses' view was not a firmly
established exception to confrontation rights and, therefore, the State's use of the screen in
Coy, pursuant to the Iowa statute's presumption of necessity, could never pass constitutional
muster. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. The Supreme Court in Coy determined that, if the Court
could sustain the State's use of the screen at all, a trial court would have to make an
individualized finding that a particular witness required protective trial procedures. Id.
25. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
26. Id.; see supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing that Iowa statute's failure
to provide that court make case-specific finding that particular witness requires special treatment
made statute unconstitutional).
27. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 2804; see ALA. CODE § 15-2-3(a) (Supp. 1986) (providing for state's use of
one-way closed-circuit television in child abuse cases). A state's use of one-way closed-circuit
television enables the witness to testify from a room outside the courtroom. Although
individuals seated inside the courtroom can see and hear the witnesses on television monitors,
the witness cannot see or hear anyone inside the courtroom. Id.; see Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4253(a) (Supp. 1986) (providing for state's use of one-way closed-circuit television); CAL.
PENAL CODn § 1347 (West 1986) (providing for state's use of two-way closed-circuit television
in certain child sexual abuse cases). Two-way closed-circuit television enables a child witness
to testify in a room separate from the courtroom and transmits the image of those seated
inside the courtroom to the child witness. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86(g) (Supp. 1987)
(providing for state's use of one-way closed-circuit television); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55
(Supp. 1987) (same); HAW. SEss. LAWS 279 (providing for state's use of two-way closed-circuit
television); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Bums 1986) (providing for state's use of one-way
closed-circuit television); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986) (same); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
15:283 (West Supp. 1987) (same); MD. CTs. & Jun. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1986)
(same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 subd. 4 (West Supp. 1987) (same); MIss. CODE ANN. §
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that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment generally requires that
a testifying witness face the defendant, the concurrence in Coy stressed that

the right physically to confront a witness is not absolute. 29 Justice O'Connor,

therefore, rejected any part of the majority opinion that might have sug-

gested that no exceptions to the right to face-to-face confrontation exist.30
Instead, Justice O'Connor maintained that the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment would not prohibit the state's use of a trial procedure

that provided for something other than physical confrontation if the state
demonstrated that the procedure was necessary to further an important

public policy.3 ' The Coy concurrence, however, agreed with the majority's
determination that the state's abrogation of the defendant's right to faceto-face confrontation would require more than the Iowa legislature's generalized finding of necessity. 32 Justice O'Connor concluded that if a trial

court made a case-specific finding that a particular witness required protective trial procedures, necessity may render the defendant's right physically
to confront a witness subservient to the state's interest in protecting child
33
abuse victims.

13-1-405 (1986) (same); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:84A-32.4 (1985) (same); N.Y. CuM. PROC. LAW
§§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (providing for state's use of two-way closed-circuit
television); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1987) (providing for state's use of
one-way closed-circuit television); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982, 5985 (Purdon 1986) (same);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-38-13.2 (Supp. 1986) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(3) (Supp.
1987) (same); see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984) (providing for state's use of child
witness' videotaped deposition or prior testimony); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2035-37 (Supp.

1985) (same); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1986) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 3511 (Supp. 1986) (same); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (Supp. 1987) (same); Mo. REv. STAT. §§
491.675-690 (1986) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401-03 (1986) (same); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1987) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1986) (same); S.C. CODE

§ 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1984) (same).
29. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, concurring
in Coy, observed that the Court repeatedly has acknowledged that the confrontation clause
reflects a preference for physical confrontation that other competing interests may overcome
in appropriate cases. Id. at 2804.
30. Id. In Coy Justice O'Connor maintained that although a particular trial procedure
may violate the confrontation clause's literal meaning, which guarantees a criminal defendant
a physical confrontation with adverse witnesses, the Court automatically should not consider
the procedure unconstitutional. Id. at 2804-05. O'Connor observed that many Supreme Court
cases that approved of the prosecution's use of hearsay evidence implicated the defendant's
literal right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses. Id. O'Connor explained that,
arguably, the confrontation clause's literal guarantee of a physical confrontation could bar the
state's use of any extra-judicial statement when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial
and, yet, the Court consistently has held that a trial court's admission of some hearsay
statements does not violate the defendant's confrontation rights. Id. at 2805. Accordingly,
Justice O'Connor concluded in Coy that exceptions to confrontation rights may include not
only a state's introduction of certain hearsay statements but also the state's use of certain
protective trial procedures that abrogate an accused's literal right to a face-to-face encounter
with adverse witnesses. Id. at 2804-05.
31. Id. at 2805.
32. Id.
33. Id. In Coy Justice O'Connor maintained that a defendant's sixth amendment right
ANN.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Coy, and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Coy suggest that state statutes which provide for the state's use of

protective trial procedures in child sexual abuse cases might pass constitutional muster if the statutes provide for an individualized finding of necessity.3 4 More particularly, the Coy decision leaves open the possibility that

the sixth amendment confrontation clause would not prohibit the state from
employing trial procedures that would shield a child witness from the trauma

of testifying in the presence of the accused. 3 If a state makes an adequate
showing that protective trial procedures are necessary to further an important
public policy, the Coy decision indicates that a state's abrogation of a
defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation with adverse witnesses would
36
not violate the sixth amendment.
As Justice O'Connor noted in Coy, many state legislatures have enacted

statutes to respond to the special needs of child victims in sexual abuse
cases.3 7 One group of statutes, for example, permits a state to present a

child witness's testimony through one-way closed-circuit television. 3 Moreover, some statutes which provide for closed-circuit television also provide

that a child witness may testify via one-way closed-circuit television outside
the physical presence of the defendant. 9 Accordingly, although the defendant is able to see and hear the witness, the witness testifies from a room
outside the courtroom and is not able to see or hear the defendant. 40 In
to a face-to-face confrontation with adverse witness may give way to a state's interest in
protecting child witnesses in sexual abuse cases. Id. O'Connor observed that a number of state
statutes provide for an individualized determination that a particular child witness requires
protective trial procedures and, therefore, should survive constitutional scrutiny. Id.; see FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 92.54(4) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring that court find substantial likelihood that
child witness, by testifying in open court or in presence of accused, will suffer trauma); N.Y.
C wm. PROC. LAw §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (requiring that court find by clear
and convincing evidence that child witness, by testifying without protective trial procedures,
will suffer harm).
34. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803-05 (indicating that state constitutionally may use protective
trial procedures in child sexual abuse cases); see supra notes 25-33 and infra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text (discussing Coy's majority and concurring opinions, which suggest that
case-specific finding of necessity of protective trial procedures in sexual abuse cases might
constitute constitutionally permissible grounds for state's abrogation of confrontation rights).
35. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (indicating that state's use of protective trial procedures
upon individualized determination that witness requires special treatment might survive constitutional scrutiny); see also id. at 2803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
36. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803-05 (indicating that state's abrogation of defendant's
confrontation rights upon case-specific finding of necessity would be constitutional).
37. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 28 and 33
(citing state statutes that provide for protective trial procedures in child sexual abuse cases).
38. See supra note 28 (citing state statutes providing for state's use of one-way closedcircuit television).
39. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(A) (Supp. 1986); (providing that child
witness shall testify outside presence of defendant); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g(a) (Supp.
1987) (same); MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(b)(2) (Supp. 1986) (same).
40. See, e.g,. Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(A) (Supp. 1986) (providing that court
shall ensure that defendant can see and hear witness but that witness cannot see or hear
defendant); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Baldwin 1986) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:283(B) (West Supp. 1987) (same).
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Craig v. State4' the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered whether
the State's presentation, pursuant to a Maryland statute, of a child abuse

victim's testimony via one-way closed-circuit television violated the accused's
42
sixth amendment right of confrontation.
In Craig the State of Maryland charged the defendant, Craig, with six
counts of child sexual abuse. 43 Prior to the defendant's trial, the State
moved, pursuant to a Maryland statute, to present the testimony of the
victim and several other children who the state alleged the defendant abused
through one-way closed-circuit television. 44 The Maryland statute provided
that the state could present a child victim's testimony by means of closed
- circuit television if the trial judge determined that the child's in court

testimony would result in the child's suffering serious emotional distress to
such an extent that the child could not reasonably communicate. 4 Applying
the Maryland statute, the trial judge granted the State's motion and the
child witnesses testified from the judge's chambers via closed-circuit television.4 While the prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, and the video
technician were present in the judge's chambers with the witness, the trial
judge, the defendant, and the jury viewed the witness' testimony from the
courtroom. 47 A private telephone line provided two-way communication

between Craig and counsel. 48 At the conclusion of Craig's trial the jury
49
convicted the defendant on all charges.

Arguing that the State's use of the closed-circuit television violated the
defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights, Craig appealed to the
41. 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd, 316 Md. 551,
560 A.2d 1129 (Md. 1989).
42. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 274-87, 544 A.2d 784, 796-803 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1988), rev'd.,

-

Md.

-,

560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989).

43. Id. at 255. In Craig the defendant, Sandra Craig, owned and operated a kindergarten
and pre-kindergarten school in Howard County, Maryland. Id. at 254. The alleged victim of
the defendant's sexual abuse, Brooke Etze, attended the defendant's school for approximately
two years when Etze was between the ages of four and six years old. Id. The victim subsequently
recounted a number of incidents in which Craig physically and sexually abused the victim. Id.
A medical examination of the victim revealed abnormal physical injuries to the victim's sexual
organs. Id. at 255. As a result of the victim's disclosures and medical examination, the State
of Maryland charged the defendant with first degree sexual offense, second degree sexual
offense, child abuse, perverted sexual practice, common law assault, and common law battery.
Id.

44. Id. at 156; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1986)
(authorizing state's use of one-way closed-circuit television in child sexual abuse case when
victim, by testifying in courtroom, will suffer emotional distress to extent that victim cannot
reasonably communicate).
45. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(ii) (Supp. 1986).
46. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 257.
47. Id.; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.

§ 9-102(b)(l)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1986) (requiring that defendant, judge, and jury remain in courtroom
during child witness' testimony from judge's chambers).
48. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 281; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(b)(3)
(Supp. 1986) (requiring that defendant have two-way telephone communication with defense
counsel during child witness' testimony from judge's chambers).
49. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 257.
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Maryland Court of Special Appeals.5 0 On appeal the court in Craig consid-

ered whether the State's use of the one-way closed-circuit television, pursuant
to the Maryland statute, unconstitutionally impinged upon the defendant's
right of confrontation."' The Craig court observed that in Coy v. Iowa the
Supreme Court did not hold that a defendant's right to face-to-face con-

frontation was without exception.12 Agreeing with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Coy, the Craig court determined that the right to a

physical confrontation with adverse witnesses is not absolute.5 a The Craig
court reasoned that in appropriate cases confrontation rights must give way
to other important interests. 54 Furthermore, the court observed that the
50. Id.
51. Id. at 274-87; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1986)
(authorizing state's use of closed-circuit television in child sexual abuse cases if child witness,
by testifying in courtroom, will suffer emotional distress to extent that witness will be unable
reasonably to communicate).

52. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 280. In Craig the Maryland appellate court noted that the
Supreme Court in Coy did not determine whether any important public policies might justify
a state's abridgement of the accused's right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witness.
Id.; see Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (noting that Court did not determine in
Coy whether defendant's sixth amendment right to physical confrontation has any exceptions).
53.. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 280-82; see Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (concluding that defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation with adverse witness
is not absolute); supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's
conclusion in Coy that defendant's right to physical confrontation may give way to other
important interests).
54. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 280-82. In Craig the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
relied in part on the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Wildermuth v. State to conclude
that a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute. Id.; see Wildermuth v.
State, 310 Md. 496, 513, 530 A.2d 275, 283-84 (Md. 1987) (holding that defendant's sixth
amendment right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute). In Wildermuth, a Maryland
jury convicted the defendant, Wildermuth, of child sexual abuse. Id. at 500. Pursuant to a
Maryland statute, the trial court permitted the state's use of closed-circuit television to present
the child victim's testimony, after the trial court determined that the victim, by testifying in
open court or in the presence of the accused, would suffer serious emotional distress. Id. at
500-02; see MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1986) (providing for state's
use of closed-circuit television to present alleged child abuse victim's testimony).
On a writ of certiorari to the Maryland Court of Appeals the defendant argued that the
state's use of the closed-circuit television, pursuant to the Maryland statute violated the
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at
501. The Maryland Court of Appeals in Wildermuth rejected the defendant's claim that the
Maryland statute violated the sixth amendment. Id. at 501, 513-25. The Wildermuth court
reasoned that the state's interest in protecting child abuse victims from the trauma of in court
testimony and the state's interest in securing a child abuse victim's testimony at trial outweigh
a defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses. Id. at 516-20. Furthermore, the Wildermuth court determined that the Maryland statute that authorized the state's
use of closed-circuit television preserved the confrontation clause's interest in the integrity of
the truthfinding process in criminal trials. Id. at 515. The Wildermuth court noted that the
Maryland statute provided for most of the confrontation components that enhance the reliability
of a witness' testimony. Id. The court in Wildermuth explained that under the Maryland
statute the witness is under oath, subject to cross-examination, and within the view of judge
and jury during the witness' testimony. Id. Accordingly, the Wildermuth court held that the
Maryland statute that provided for the state's use of closed-circuit television did not violate a
defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights. Id. at 520.
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Supreme Court has permitted a prosecuting attorney's use of extrajudicial

declarations based on exceptions to the rule against hearsay.

5

The court in

Craig determined that because exceptions to the hearsay rule implicate a

defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses, the
Supreme Court implicitly has acknowledged exceptions to the right of
physical confrontation. 6 Accordingly, the Craig court held that a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation may, in certain circumstances,
57
give way to a state legislature's consideration of an important public policy.
Having found that a defendant's right to physical confrontation is not
absolute, the court in Craig considered whether the State's use of the closed-

circuit television was necessary to further an important public policy.58 The
Maryland appellate court in Craig determined that cases involving a prosecutor's use of hearsay evidence provide the proper analytical framework
by which the Craig court should consider the constitutionality of the State's

use of the closed-circuit television.

9

The Craig court, therefore, required

55. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 281-84.
56. Id. In Craig, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted that Supreme Court
cases upholding a trial court's admission of extra-judicial statements allow the prosecution to
present evidence without the accused having an opportunity physically to confront the declarant
at trial. Id.; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases that
upheld trial court's admission of hearsay evidence). Accordingly, the Craig court determined
that the right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses is not absolute. Craig, 76 Md.
App. at 282.
57. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 282-83.
58. Id. at 283-87.
59. Id. at 282-84. In Craigthe Maryland Court of Special Appeals relied on the Maryland
Court of Appeals' decision in Wildermuth v. State to conclude that the court should examine
the confrontation issue in light of cases involving hearsay evidence. Id. 282-83; see Wildermuth
v. State, 310 Md. 496, 514-20 (1987) (finding that cases involving court's admission of hearsay
evidence provide proper analytical framework for appellate court's consideration of constitutionality of closed-circuit television statute); supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Wildermuth). In Wildermuth the Maryland Court of
Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts to resolve whether the
Maryland statute that authorized the State's use of closed-circuit television violated the sixth
amendment confrontation clause. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 514-20; see Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (finding that State's use of hearsay evidence was constitutional). The
Wildermuth court observed that in Roberts the prosecution sought to introduce an unavailable
witness' preliminary hearing testimony. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 514. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59.
The Wildermuth court noted that the Supreme Court in Roberts determined that the State's
use of hearsay evidence would be constitutional if the State demonstrated that the witness was
unavailable for trial and the out of court statement was reliable. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 51415; see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that hearsay evidence is admissable
if party offering extra-judicial statement can demonstrate that witness is unavailable and that
statement is reliable). Accordingly, in considering whether the Maryland statute was constitutional, the Wildermuth court determined that the Maryland statute would have to provide that
the state could use closed-circuit television only if the state could show that without closedcircuit television the witness would be unavailable to testify at trial and that the witness'
testimony via closed-circuit television would be reliable. Id. at 515. The Wildermuth court
concluded that the Maryland statute provided for the state's use of closed-circuit television
only if the witness was unavailable. Id. at 519. The Wildermuth court reasoned that the
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that the State demonstrate, first, that absent the State's use of protective

trial procedures the witnesses would have been unavailable to testify and,

second, that the witnesses' televised testimony was reliable. 60 In considering
whether the State in Craig demonstrated unavailability, the Maryland appellate court determined that if the State showed that a child witness would

suffer severe emotional distress and would be unable to communicate in
court, the State's showing would be tantamount to a showing of unavailability. 6' Accordingly, the Craig court determined that if the trauma of in

court testimony rendered a child victim unable to communicate, the State's
interest in prosecuting the accused would necessitate the State's use of
closed-circuit television. 62 The Craig court, however, observed the Supreme

Court's mandate in Coy that a court must make a case-specific finding of63
necessity before a court may abrogate a defendant's confrontation rights.
In light of expert testimony that indicated that each of the child witnesses

in Craig would suffer emotional trauma and, thereby, have difficulty
communicating if the State compelled the witnesses to testify in court, .the

Craig court determined that the trial judge had made a case-specific finding
of necessity. 64 Furthermore, the Craig court determined that the State had

shown that the child witnesses' testimony via one-way closed circuit television
was reliable. 65 The Craig court reasoned that the Maryland statute that
Maryland statute authorized the state's use of closed-circuit television only if the state could
demonstrate that the child witness, by testifying in open court, would suffer such emotional
distress that the witness would not be able to communicate. Id.; see MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1985) (authorizing state's use of closed-circuit television if
child witness, by testifying in court, would suffer emotional distress to extent that witness
would not be able to reasonably communicate). The Wildermuth court determined that the
state's demonstration that the child witness would suffer such distress that the witness would
not be able to communicate at trial was tantamount to the state's showing of unavailability.
Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 519; see supra note 54 (discussing Wildermuth court's conclusion that
witness's testimony via closed-circuit television was reliable). Accordingly, in Wildermuth the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Maryland statute that provided for the state's use
of closed-circuit television did not violate the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 520.
60. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 283-87.
61. Id. at 283-84. The Craig court relied on the Maryland Court of Appeals' holding in
Wildermuth to conclude that a trial court's finding that a child witness would be unable to
communicate in open court is tantamount to a finding of unavailability. Id.; see MD.'CTs. &
JuD. PROC. CODE AiNN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1986) (providing for state's use of closedcircuit television if state demonstrates that child witness will be unable to communicate in
court); supra note 59 (discussing Wildermuth court's finding that state's showing that child
witness will be unable to communicate at trial was tantamount to showing of unavailability).
62. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 283.
63. Id. at 283-84; see Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (noting that if right to
physical confrontation has any exceptions, trial court must make individualized finding of
necessity).
64. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 285-87.
65. Id. at 287. In Craig the Maryland Court of Special Appeals relied on the Maryland
Court of Appeals' decision in Wildermuth to determine that a child witness' testimony via
closed-circuit television is reliable. See supra note 54 (discussing Wildermuth court's conclusion
that testimony through closed-circuit television is reliable).
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authorized the State's use of closed-circuit television provided for most

aspects of the confrontation rights that enhance the reliability of a witness'

testimony. 6 Because the State demonstrated that without protective trial

procedures the child witnesses would be unavailable to testify, and that the
witnesses' testimony was reliable, the Maryland appellate court in Craig
held that the State's use of closed-circuit television, pursuant to the Maryland
statute, did not violate the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses.6 7

The Craig court, therefore, affirmed the defendant's conviction and the
defendant appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals.6

On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Maryland
statute authorizing the State's use of closed-circuit television in certain child
abuse cases facially was constitutional. 69 The Maryland Court of Appeals

reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Coy v. Iowa implicitly
acknowledged that a state may implement protective trial procedures that
abrogate a defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses if the state's use of the protective procedures is necessary to further
an important public policy. 70 In Craig the Maryland Court of Appeals

66. Craig,76 Md. App. at 287; see supra note 54 (discussing Maryland Court of Appeals'
conclusion in Wildermuth that closed-circuit television preserves reliability of witness' testimony).

67. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 285-87.
68. Id. at 298, rev'd, 316 Md. 458, -, 560 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Md. 1989).
69. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, -, 560 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Md. 1989); see MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1986) (providing for state's use of closed-circuit
television to present alleged child abuse victim's testimony).
70. Id. at -, 560 A.2d at 1124-25. In Craigthe Maryland Court of Appeals concluded
that the Coy decision did not hold that a defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter with
adverse witnesses is absolute. Id. at -, 560 A.2d at 1121, 1124; see Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.
Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (noting that Court in Coy was not determining whether defendant's
sixth amendment right to physical confrontation has any exceptions). Moreover, in Craig the
Maryland Court of Appeals observed that Justice O'Connor, concurring in Coy, expressly
concluded that a defendant's right to physical confrontation may give way to compelling state
interests. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1124-25; see Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (concluding that defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute);
supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's conclusion in Coy
that defendant's right to physical confrontation may give way to countervailing interests). The
state court of appeals in Craig also observed that, although the majority opinion in Coy
strenuously attacked the dissent, the majority did not take issue with Justice O'Connor's
concurrence and,therefore, implicitly adopted O'Connor's opinion that a defendant's confrontation rights are not absolute. Craig, 316 Md. at __,
560 A.2d at 1125; see Coy, 108 S.
Ct. at 2801 n.2 (asserting impropriety of dissenting opinion in Coy); id. at 2805 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (concluding that defendant's right to physical confrontation is not absolute);
see also Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 279-80, 544 A.2d 784, 798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988) (noting that majority opinion in Coy attempted to rebut dissent but did not attempt to
rebut concurrence). Accordingly, in Craig the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that
Coy did not preclude, in appropriate circumstances, a state's use of certain trial procedures
that effectively abrogate the defendant's constitutional right to a face-to-face encounter with
adverse witnesses. Craig, 316 Md. at __ , 560 A.2d at 1125; see Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803
(noting that Court was not holding that defendant's right to physical confrontation is without
exceptions); see also id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that defendant's right
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concluded that the State's interest in presenting an otherwise unavailable
child witness' testimony constituted an important public policy. 71 Moreover,
the court of appeals observed that the Maryland statute required that a trial

court make a case-specific determination that without the state's use of oneway closed-circuit television a particular child witness would be unavailable
to testify in court.72 Accordingly, because the Maryland statute authorizing
the State's use of closed-circuit television provided for an individualized
determination of necessity, the state court of appeals in Craig held that the
73
statute facially was constitutional.

to face-to-face confrontation with adverse witness may give way to countervailing interests).
In addition to finding that the Coy decision did not prohibit a state's use of protective
trial procedures that supplant physical confrontation, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Craig
relied on its earlier decision in Wildermuth v. State to conclude that a defendant's confrontation
rights are not absolute. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1121, 1125-26; see Wildermuth
v. State, 310 Md. 496, 513, 530 A.2d 275, 283-84 (Md. 1987) (holding that defendant's right
to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute); supra note 54 (discussing Maryland Court of
Appeals' decision in Wildermuth that defendant's right to physical confrontation is not
absolute). Furthermore, in Craig the Maryland Court of Appeals observed that several other
state courts had concluded that in appropriate circumstances a state may abrogate a defendant's
right to a face to-face encounter with adverse witnesses. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d
at 1125; see, e.g., State v. Thomas, 150 Wis. 2d 374, ....
442 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Wis. 1989)
(holding that defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation has exceptions); Brady v. State,
540 N.E.2d 69, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that compelling interests may override
defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation); State v. Bonello, 310 Conn. 51,
-, 554
A.2d 277, 281 (Conn. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2103 (1989) (holding that defendant's
right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute).
71. Craig,316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1121, 1125-26. The Maryland Court of Appeals
in Craig relied on its earlier decision in Wildermuth v. State to conclude that the state's
interest in presenting the testimony of an otherwise unavailable witness' testimony constitutes
the important public policy necessary to override a defendant's constitutional right to physical
confrontation. Id.; see Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 518-20, 530 A.2d 275, 286-87 (Md.
1987) (holding that state's interest in presenting testimony of otherwise unavailable child witness
is sufficiently compelling to justify state's use of trial procedures that abrogate defendant's
confrontation rights); supra note 54 (discussing Maryland Court of Appeals' holding in
Wildermuth that state's interest in presenting otherwise unavailable witness' testimony may
outweigh defendant's right to physical confrontation). Moreover, the Craig court of appeals
relied on its earlier decision in Wildermuth v. State to conclude that under the Maryland
statute, a child witness' testimony through one-way closed circuit television preserves most of
the truth-enhancing aspects of the confrontation right and, therefore, is reliable. Craig, 316
Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1125-26; see Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 515 (holding that Maryland
statute authorizing state's use of closed-circuit television preserves reliability of witness'
testimony); supra note 54 (discussing Wildermuth court's conclusion that testimony through
closed-circuit television is reliable).
72. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1121; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 9-102(a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1986) (providing for state's use of closed-circuit television upon trial
court's case-specific finding that procedure is necessary to present otherwise unavailable child
witness' testimony); see also Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (noting that if any
exceptions to defendant's right to physical confrontation exist, court must make individualized
determination that exception is necessary to further important public policy); id. at 2805
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that state may abrogate defendant's right to face-toface encounter with adverse witnesses upon case-specific finding of necessity).
73. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1121; see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
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Having found that the Maryland statute was constitutional, the state
court of appeals in Craig next considered whether the trial court properly
allowed the State to invoke the statute and present the child witnesses'
testimony via closed-circuit television. 74 In holding that the State's use of
closed-circuit television in Craig violated the defendant's confrontation
rights, the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court failed
to determine whether the State's use of protective trial procedures was
necessary. 7- The state court of appeals explained that, under the Maryland
statute, the state can demonstrate necessity only by showing that a face-toface encounter with the defendant will cause a child witness to suffer such
severe emotional distress that the child will be unavailable to testify at
trial. 76 The Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned that, unless the defendant's
presence is the operative condition rendering a child witness unavailable to
testify, the state's separation of the defendant and the child during the
child's testimony is unnecessary and, therefore, constitutionally impermissible. 7 In Craig the state court of appeals observed that the trial court

text (discussing Maryland Court of Appeals' holding in Craig that statute authorizing state's
use of closed-circuit television is constitutional).
74. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1122-29.
75. Id. at _
, 560 A.2d 1121, 1125-26.
76. Id. at
, 560 A.2d 1126-27. In Craig the state court of appeals observed that the
Maryland statute authorized the state's use of closed-circuit television if the state demonstrated
that testimony by a child witness "in the courtroom" would cause the child to suffer severe
emotional distress and, therefore, be unavailable to testify at trial. Id. at __
, 560 A.2d at
1126; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(2)(ii) (providing for state's use of
closed-circuit television if, by testifying "in the courtroom," child witness will suffer emotional
distress to extent that child will be unable to communicate at trial). The state court of appeals,
therefore, acknowledged in Craig that the Maryland statute expressly did not require that the
defendant's presence be the primary cause of a child witness' emotional distress and resulting
unavailability in order for the state to invoke the state. Craig,'316 Md. at __,
560 A.2d at
1126-27. Nevertheless, in Craigthe Maryland Court of Appeals construed the statute to require
that a face-to-face encounter with the defendant be the operative condition rendering a child
witness unavailable to testify and, therefore, necessitating the state's use of one-way closedcircuit television. Id.
77. Craig, 316 Md. at
-, 560 A.2d at 1126-28. In finding that the state may not
invoke the Maryland statute unless the state demonstrates that the defendant's presence will
be the primary cause of a child witness' emotional distress, the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Craig emphasized the importance of the right to physical confrontation. Id. at
-, 560
A.2d at 1125-27; see also id. at
,__,
560 A.2d at 1126 (noting that in Coy Supreme Court
emphasized importance of defendant's right to physical confrontation); Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.
Ct. 2798, 2801-02 (1988) (emphasizing importance of sixth amendment right of confrontation).
Moreover, the Craig court of appeals reiterated that the state may abridge a defendant's right
to physical confrontation only upon a case-specific finding of necessity. Craig, 316 Md. at
560 A.2d at 1126. Accordingly, in Craig the court of appeals concluded that the state's
demonstration that a child witness would be unable to testify in open court or in the presence
of strangers would not support a case-specific finding of necessity. Id. The state court of
appeals explained that the state can not demonstrate that it is necessary to prevent a defendant
from facing a testifying witness unless the state can demonstrate that a face-to-face encounter
with the defendant will cause the witness to be unable to communicate in court. Id. at
__
560 A.2d at 1126-27. In Craigthe Maryland Court of Appeals observed that other state
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specifically did not find that a face-to-face encounter with the defendant
would have caused the child witnesses to suffer severe emotional distress
and, therefore, be unavailable to testify at trial. 71 Instead, the Maryland
Court of Appeals noted, the trial court in Craig authorized the State's use
of closed-circuit television on the basis of expert testimony that indicated
that the prospect simply of testifying in open court would cause the child
witnesses to suffer emotional distress. 79 In Craig, therefore, the Maryland

courts had reached similar conclusions. Id. at
-, 560 A.2d at 1127; see State v. Jarzbek,
210 Conn. 396,
-, 554 A.2d 1094, 1095 (Conn. 1989) (holding that state may not abridge
defendant's right to physical confrontation unless state demonstrates that defendant's presence
would so intimidate alleged child abuse victim that child's testimony would be untrustworthy);
State v. Crandell, 231 N.J. Super. 124, __
, 555 A.2d 35, 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (holding that trial court may not allow state's use of closed-circuit television unless trial
court finds that presence of defendant will cause alleged child abuse victim to suffer severe
emotional distress); State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418,
-, 768 P.2d 150, 152, 163-64 (Ariz.
1988) (holding that trial court may not authorize state to abrogate defendant's right to physical
confrontation unless state demonstrates that face-to-face encounter with defendant will cause
child witness to suffer emotional trauma to extent that child will be unable to communicate
in court). In Craig, therefore, the state court of appeals held that to invoke the Maryland
statute and use one-way closed-circuit television the state must show that the defendant's
presence will be the cause of a child witness' emotional distress and resulting unavailability.
Craig, 316 Md. at __
,560 A.2d at 1127.
78. Craig, 316 Md. at -,
560 A.2d at 1128-29. The Maryland Court of Appeals in
Craig noted that the trial judge did not question any of the child witnesses himself and did
not observe how the child witnesses behaved in the defendant's presence. Id. Accordingly, the
Craigcourt of appeals concluded that the states' use of closed-circuit television was unnecessary
to procure the child witnesses' testimony. Id.
79. Id. In Craig the Maryland Court of Appeals delineated the procedures a trial court
must follow before authorizing the state's use of closed-circuit television. Id. at
-,
560
A.2d 1127-28. To invoke the Maryland statute, the court of appeals held, the state initially
must question the child witness in the defendant's presence. Id. at -, 560 A.2d at 1127.
The Craig court of appeals explained that if the state questions the child witness in the
defendant's presence the trial judge will be able to determine whether the defendant's presence
has a traumatizing effect on the child. Id. Thereafter, the state court of appeals continued,
the trial judge must consider whether any alternatives to the state's use of one-way closedcircuit television are feasible. Id. at __,
560 A.2d at 1128. The state court of appeals
explained that, in light of the importance of the confrontation right, the Maryland statute
cannot be the exclusive measure of witness protection but, instead, must be the last resort.
Id. The Craigcourt of appeals, therefore, determined that if a child witness would be able to
testify via two-way closed-circuit television, the trial court should authorize that procedure.
Id. The Craig court of appeals reasoned that two-way closed-circuit television is preferable
because the defendant can see the testifying witness and, more importantly, the witness can
see the defendant. Id.; see supra note 28 (describing two-way closed-circuit television). In Craig
the court of appeals concluded that if the trial judge determines that neither two-way closedcircuit television nor any other alternative procedure will enable the child witness to testify,
the trial court may authorize the state to invoke the Maryland statute and use one-way closedcircuit television. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1128.
Although finding that expert testimony may support a trial judge's conclusion that the
state's use of one-way closed-circuit television is necessary, the state court of appeals held that
the expert testimony in Craigwas insufficient to support the state's invocation of the Maryland
statute. Id. at -,
560 A.2d at 1128-29. Instead, the court of appeals observed, in Craig
the expert witnesses testified that the child witnesses would have difficulty facing, not only
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Court of Appeals held that because the trial court failed to determine that
the State's use of closed-circuit television was necessary, the State violated

the defendant's constitutional right to physical confrontation. 0 Accordingly,
the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction. s'
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals in Craig determined that in
certain child abuse cases the state may abrogate a defendant's right to a

face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Bergstrom82 concluded that the

Commonwealth constitutionally may not record a witness' testimony outside
the physical presence of the defendant."

In Bergstrom a Massachusetts

grand jury indicted the defendant for rape and for indecent assault and
battery on the defendant's two minor daughters. 84 Prior to Bergstrom's trial
the Commonwealth moved, pursuant to a Massachusetts statute, to present
the child victims' testimony via one-way closed-circuit television. 85 The

Massachusetts statute provided that the Commonwealth could present a
child witness' testimony through closed-circuit television if the trial court
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the child witness would

suffer trauma from testifying in open court or from testifying in the presence
of the accused. 6 Under the Massachusetts statute a child witness may testify
outside the presence of the accused if a face-to-face encounter with the

defendant would cause the child emotional harm.8 7 If, however, a child

witness would suffer emotional trauma solely by reason of testifying in
open court, not by reason of the defendant's presence, the statute required
that the defendant be present during the child's testimony.88 Pursuant to
the Commonwealth statute, the trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing

the defendant, but also a courtroom of strangers. Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial judge specifically did not find, and could not have found on the basis of the
evidence before the judge, that the defendant's presence would have been the primary cause
for the child witnesses to suffer emotional distress and as a result be unavailable to testify at
trial. Id. Moreover, the Craig court of appeals noted that although the trial judge properly
may have found that the State's use of closed-circuit television was necessary if the judge
either had questioned the child witnesses himself or personally had observed the effect of the
defendant's presence on child witness' behavior, the judge had done neither. Id.; see supra
note 78 and accompanying text (noting that trial court in Craig failed to question or observe
child witnesses before authorizing State's use of closed-circuit television). Accordingly, in Craig
the court of appeals held that the trial judge improperly allowed the State to invoke the
Maryland statute and abridge the defendant's confrontation rights. Craig, 316, Md. at
560 A.2d at 1129.
80. Craig, 316 Md. at

,

560 A.2d at 1129.

81. Craig, 316 Md. at
560 A.2d at 1129.
82. 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988).
83. Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534,

-,

524 N.E.2d 366, 367-78 (Mass.

1988).
84. Id. at

-,

524 N.E.2d at 367.

85. Id.; see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing
Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television to present child abuse victim's testimony).
86. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1987).
87. Id. at § 16D(l)(b)(1).
88. Id. at § 16D(1)(b)(3).

CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

1989]

1021

to determine the possibility of the child witnesses suffering psychological
trauma. 89 The trial judge found that the Commonwealth, in accordance
with the Massachusetts statute, had established that the child witnesses
would suffer psychological trauma if the Commonwealth forced the witnesses to testify in the presence of the defendant.9 The trial judge, therefore,
granted the Commonwealth's motion to present the children's testimony
outside the defendant's presence through one-way closed-circuit television. 9'
At Bergstrom's trial both child witnesses gave their testimony in a room
separate from the courtroom. 92 The judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney
were present in the room with the children. 93 The defendant and the jury,
however, observed the witnesses' testimony on television monitors inside
the courtroom.9 4 Bergstrom was able to communicate with defense counsel
throughout the children's testimony. 95 At the conclusion of the trial the
jury convicted the defendant on all counts and the defendant appealed the
96
conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
On appeal Bergstrom argued that the Commonwealth's use of the
televised testimony, pursuant to the Massachusetts statute, violated the
defendant's right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution and under article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights. 97 The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth's use of the closed-circuit television violated the defendant's confrontation rights under the Massachusetts constitution and the court, therefore,
reversed Bergstrom's conviction. 98 The Bergstrom court reasoned that because the literal language of article 12 guarantees an accused the right to
face-to-face confrontation with adverse witnesses, the Commonwealth's use
of the closed-circuit television impermissibly impinged upon the defendant's
confrontation rights.9 Although acknowledging that under either the federal

89. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at __,
524 N.E.2d at 369; see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, § 16D(1)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring that trial court find by preponderance of
evidence that child witness, by testifying in open court or in presence of accused, will suffer

harm).
90. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at __,
524 N.E.2d at 367, 369. At the evidentiary hearing
in Bergstrom the Commonwealth offered expert testimony to show that the child witnesses
would suffer psychological trauma if the Commonwealth required-the witnesses to testify in
open court or in the presence of the accused. Id. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 369.
91. Id. at

__,

524 N.E.2d at 367, 370.

92. Id. at
, 524 N.E.2d at 370; see MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(1)(b)(4)
(West Supp. 1987) (providing that child witness testify via closed-circuit television from setting
outside courtroom).
93. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 370; see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, § 16D(1)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987) (providing for trial judge's and opposing counsel's
presence in room with child testifying through closed-circuit television).
94. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at

__,

524 N.E.2d at 370.

95. Id.
96. Id. at
97. Id. at
98. Id. at

-,

__,
__,

524 N.E.2d at 367.
524 N.E.2d at 370.
524 N.E.2d at 371-75.

99. Id. In Bergstrom the Massachusetts court observed that the literal language of article
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constitution or the Massachusetts constitution the right of confrontation is
not without exception, the Bergstrom court observed that exceptions to a
defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses are not
crime specific.'00 The court in Bergstrom determined that the Massachusetts
statute impermissibly created an exception to a defendant's confrontation
rights by distinguishing between child abuse victims and other classes of
witnesses.101 The right of confrontation under article 12, the Bergstrom court
explained, applies impartially to all classes of defendants and to all categories
of crimes.'0 2 The Bergstrom court, therefore, concluded that the Massachusetts legislature could not, consistently with a defendant's right of confrontation, distinguish between child witnesses in sexual abuse cases and any
other class of witnesses.103 Finding that the Commonwealth constitutionally
could not abrogate a defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter with
adverse witnesses, the Bergstrom court held that the Massachusetts statute
authorizing the Commonwealth's use of one-way closed-circuit television in
child sexual abuse cases violated article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution. 104

Furthermore, although the Bergstrom court did not hold that the
Commonwealth never could record a witness' testimony outside the presence
of the jury, the court found that the Commonwealth's use of the closedcircuit television in Bergstrom was unconstitutional on two additional
grounds.' 0 5 The Bergstrom court observed that the closed-circuit television

12 of the Massachusetts constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right physically to
confront adverse witnesses. Id. at __
, 524 N.E.2d at 371. Although acknowledging that
under both the federal constitution and Commonwealth constitution a defendant's confrontation
rights are not absolute, the Bergstrom court noted that the right to physical confrontation is
paramount except in limited circumstances. Id. at __
, 524 N.E.2d at 373. The Bergstrom
court, however, emphasized that the court never had permitted the Commonwealth to present
an available witness to testify outside the defendant's presence. Id. Furthermore, the court in
Bergstrom observed that article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution guarantees confrontation
rights to all criminal defendants and does not discriminate against certain classes of defendants
or categories of crimes. Id. at __
, 524 N.E.2d at 374. Accordingly, the Bergstrom court
concluded that the Massachusetts legislature could not provide that in certain cases of child
abuse, the Commonwealth may abrogate a defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter with
adverse witnesses. Id. In Bergstrom, therefore, the court concluded that the Massachusetts
statute that authorized the Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television in child sexual
abuse cases violated article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution. Id. Accordingly, the Bergstrom
court reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 378.
100. Id. at -, 524 N.E.2d 374.
101. Id.; see supra note 99 (discussing Bergstrom court's conclusion that article 12 of
Massachusetts constitution applies indiscriminately to all classes of defendants and to all
categories of crimes).
102. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at
-, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
103. Id.
104. Id. Although holding that the Massachusetts statute violated article 12 of the
Massachusetts constitution, the Bergstrom court recognized that the court's article 12 analysis
essentially was identical to a sixth amendment analysis under the federal constitution. Id. at
524 N.E.2d 371-73.
105. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 375-78.
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transmission at Bergstrom's trial distorted sight and sound and, thereby,
failed to provide the jury with an adequate means by which to observe the
witnesses' demeanor.'06 The Bergstrom court, therefore, determined that the
technical inadequacies of the closed-circuit transmission in Bergstrom undermined the integrity of the jury's factual determinations." °7 Moreover, the
Bergstrom court determined that, absent compelling circumstances, the
confrontation clause requires that a jury personally view a witness' testimony.108 Accordingly, the Massachusetts court in Bergstrom concluded that
the Commonwealth would have to show by more than a preponderance of
the evidence that the Commonwealth's recording of a witness testimony
outside the presence of the jury is necessary to protect a child witness'

emotional well-being.'

9

The Bergstrom court reasoned that the Common-

wealth's presentation of a witness' testimony outside the presence of the

jury via closed-circuit television requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate
a compelling need for the protective trial procedures." 0 The Bergstrom court
concluded that the Commonwealth's showing beyond a reasonable doubt

that a particular witness would suffer severe emotional trauma upon testifying in the presence of the jufr would constitute a compelling need for
the Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television."' Having found that
the Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television to record the witnesses'
testimony outside the defendant's presence violated the defendant's right to
2
confrontation, the Bergstrom court reversed the defendant's conviction."

The statutes at issue in Craig and Bergstrom are representative of a
number of state statutes that provide for an exception in certain child sexual
3
abuse cases to a defendant's right physically to confront adverse witnesses.1

Some of the statutes provide for a state's use of one-way closed-circuit
television to shield a child witness from the trauma of testifying in open
court or in the presence of the accused. 1 4 Furthermore, a number of state

106. Id. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 376.
107. Id.
108. Id. In Bergstrom the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that, absent
compelling circumstances, the jury personally should observe a witness' demeanor. Id. The
Bergstrom Court determined that a television transmission does not afford a jury the equivalent
of a personal observation of a witness' demeanor while the witness testifies and, therefore,
does not adequately serve the confrontation clause's interest in enhancing the jury's truthfinding
function. Id.; see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (noting that confrontation rights
assure reliability of truthfinding process in criminal trials).
109. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 376.
110. Id.
111.
Id.
112. Id. at
, 524 N.E.2d at 374, 378.
113. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (citing state statutes which provide for
states' presentation of child abuse victim's testimony through closed-circuit television).
114. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987) (providing for state's use of closedcircuit television to protect child abuse victim from emotional distress accompanying testimony
in open court); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns 1986) (same); MINN. STATE ANN. § 595.02,
subd. 4 (West Supp. 1987) (providing for state's use of closed-circuit television if court
determines that child witness, by testifying in presence of defendant, will suffer psychological
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statutes, like the Maryland statute in Craig and the Massachusetts statute
in Bergstrom, require that a trial court make a case-specific finding that a
particular witness requires the state's use of closed-circuit television to
present the witness' testimony."I5 If a statute requires that a state demonstrate
that protective trial procedures are necessary to present the testimony of an
alleged child abuse victim, the Supreme Court's dicta in Coy v. Iowa
'6
suggests that the Court will find the statute constitutionally permissible."
As Justice O'Connor observed in Coy, however, the Court's primary focus
will be on whether a state has made a constitutionally sufficient showing
of necessity to justify the state's deprivation of a defendant's right to
7
physical confrontation."
In light of Coy's dicta, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Craig v.
State properly concluded that the to the Maryland statute providing for the
state's use of closed-circuit television facially was constitutional." 8 Although
in Coy v. Iowa the Supreme Court determined that the state's use of a
screen to block the accused from the witness' view was a blatant violation
of the defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation, the Court did
not hold that the right to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses
is absolute." 9 Instead, both the majority and concurring opinions in Coy
indicate that in appropriate cases a state's implementation of certain protective trial procedures, which effectively abrogate a defendant's right to
physical confrontation, may pass constitutional muster. 120 The Coy decision
suggests that, if a statute requires that a trial court must make a casespecific finding that certain trial procedures are necessary to present a
particular child witness testimony, the state's use of such procedures would
trauma that renders child unavailable to testify); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (1986) (authorizing state's use of closed-circuit television if defendant's presence will cause child witness to
suffer emotional or mental distress).
115. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing state's use of closedcircuit television if judge determines that substantial likelihood exists that child victim, by
testifying in open-court, will suffer emotional harm); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987)
(same); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns 1986) (authorizing state's use of closed-circuit
television if trial court finds that child witness, by testifying in court, likely will suffer trauma).
116. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (indicating that state's use of protective trial
procedures upon case-specific finding of necessity would be constitutional); id. at 2803-05
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text (discussing that
state statutes which provide for case-specific finding of necessity are constitutional).
117. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (stating that Court will focus on whether state has
demonstrated that abrogation of defendant's right to physical confrontation is necessary).
118. Craig, 316 Md. 551,
-, 560 A.2d 1120, 1121-29 (Md. 1989); see also Craig, 76
Md. App. 251, 283-87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (finding Maryland statute authorizing state's
use of one-way closed-circuit television constitutional).
119. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (suggesting that defendant's right to physical confrontation may have exceptions); id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); supra notes
25-36 and accompanying text (discussing that Supreme Court in Coy did not hold that
defendant's right to physical confrontation has no exceptions).
120. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (indicating that important public policy may outweigh
defendant's right to physical confrontation); id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same);
supra notes 25, 27-36 (same).
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not violate the defendant's confrontation rights. 121 In accordance with Coy
the Maryland statute at issue in Craig provided that a trial court make an
individualized determination that a particular child witness requires protective trial procedures.' 22 In Craig the state court of appeals correctly determined that under the Maryland statute the state's showing that a child
witness would be unable to testify in the presence of the defendant would
be tantamount to a showing of unavailability.123 Furthermore, the Craig
court of appeals properly found that the state's interest in presenting the
testimony of an otherwise unavailable witness constitutes the important
public policy necessary to justify the state's abridgement of a defendant's
confrontation rights.' 24 The Supreme Court in Coy did not consider whether
a state's interest in procuring an otherwise unavailable witness' trial testimony could justify the state's abrogation of a defendant's right to face
adverse witnesses. 121 In holding that the Iowa statute violated the defendant's

121. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (indicating that court constitutionally may abrogate
defendant's confrontation rights if court makes case-specific finding that state's abrogation of
defendant's confrontation rights is necessary to protect particular witness); id. at 2803-05
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing that
state's abridgement of defendant's confrontation rights upon trial court's case-specific finding
of necessity is constitutional).
122. Craig, 316 Md. at

-,

560 A.2d at 1121; see MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN,.

§ 9-102(a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1986) (requiring that trial court make case-specific finding that state's
use of one-way closed-circuit television is necessary).
123. Craig, 316 Md. at -,
560 A.2d at 1125-26; see MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-102(a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1985) (authorizing state's use of one-way closed-circuit television
if child witness will suffer serious emotional distress and, therefore, be unable to communicate
in court); supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing state court of appeals' decision in
Craig that Maryland statute authorized states use of closed-circuit television if procedure is
necessary to present otherwise unavailable witness' testimony); Craig, -, Md. at -, 560
A.2d at 1125-26 (relying on court of appeals' earlier decision in Wildermuth v. State to
conclude that Maryland statute authorizes state's use of one-way closed-circuit television upon
finding of witness unavailability); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 515, 530 A.2d 275, 28586 (Md. 1987) (holding that Maryland statute authorizes state's use of one-way closed-circuit
television upon case-specific finding of witness unavailability); supra notes 54 & 59 (discussing
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Wildermuth); see also Craig, 76 Md. App. 250, 28384, 544 A.2d 784, 800 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (holding that Maryland statute authorizes
state's use of one-way closed-circuit television upon case-specific finding of witness unavailability); supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing Court of Special Appeals' holding
in Craig that state may invoke Maryland statute upon case-specific finding of witness unavailability).
124. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1121; see id. (relying on Maryland Court of
Appeals' earlier decision in Wildermuth v. State to conclude that state's interest in presenting
testimony of otherwise unavailable child witness may outweigh defendant's right to physical
confrontation); Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 516-20 (holding that state's interest in procuring
alleged child abuse victim's trial testimony outweighs defendant's right to face-to-face encounter
with adverse witnesses); supra notes 54 & 59 (discussing Maryland Court of Appeals' decision
in Wildermuth); see also Craig, 76 Md. App. at 283 (finding that state's interest in presenting
testimony of otherwise unavailable child witness outweighs defendant's confrontation rights).
125. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799-803 (1988) (considering whether state's interest in
protecting alleged child abuse victims emotional well-being constitutes important public policy,
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confrontation rights, the Supreme Court emphasized that the right to
physical confrontation is important because physical confrontation enhances
the truthfinding process in criminal trials. 126 As the Craig court reasoned,
however, if a face-to-face encounter with the defendant will cause a child
witness to suffer such severe emotional distress that the child will be unable
to testify at trial, the defendant's right to physical confrontation will
undermine the integrity of the truthfinding process. 127 Accordingly, the

but not considering state's interest in presenting testimony of otherwise unavailable child
witness); id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); see also supra notes 27-37 and
accompanying text (discussing that Coy decision suggests that state's interest in protecting
alleged child abuse victims from emotional harm may override defendant's right to physical
confrontation).
126. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801-03; see supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (discussing
Surpeme Court's emphasis in Coy on importance of defendant's right of confrontation to
reliability of factfinding process in criminal trials).
127. See Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1125-26 (finding that child witness' inability
to testify in presence of defendant may undermine truth-seeking function of trial); see also
Wildermuth v. State, 320 Md. 496, 516-20, 520 A.2d 275, 284-87 (Md. 1987) (holding that
state's interest in presenting otherwise unavailable witness' testimony justifies state's infringement of defendant's confrontation rights).
Like the Maryland Court of Appeals in Craig, the Supreme Court of Connecticut in State
v. Bonello concluded that a child witness' inability to testify in the presence of the accused
would implicate the reliability of the truthfinding process in a criminal trial. State v. Bonello,
210 Conn. 51,
-, 554 A.2d 277, 281-82 (Conn. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2103 (1989).
In Bonello the State of Connecticut charged the defendant with sexual assault in the first and
second degree and risk of injury to a minor. Id. at _
, 554 A.2d at 278. The charges
against the defendant arose from allegations that the defendant, Bonello, sexually abused a
five year old child. Id. Prior to the defendant's trial, the State moved to videotape the alleged
victim's testimony outside the defendant's physical presence. Id. at
-, 554 A.2d at 279.
Although a Connecticut statute now authorizes the State in appropriate circumstances to
present a child abuse victim's videotaped deposition at trial, the statute was not in effect at
the time of Bonello's trial. Id. at
-, 554 A.2d 283 n.5; see Co N. GEN. STAT. §54-86g
(Supp. 1987) (providing for State's use of videotaped testimony in certain child sexual abuse
cases). In a pretrial hearing on the State's motion the State presented the testimony of a social
worker and a psychiatrist to demonstrate that the intimidating presence of the defendant would
undermine the reliability of the alleged victim's testimony. Bonello, 210 Conn. at
-, 554
A.2d at 179. At the pretrial hearing the social worker testified that the defendant's presence
would intimidate the victim, and that the defendant's absence would lead to more accurate
testimony from the victim. Id. at _
, 554 A.2d at 283. The psychiatrist testified at the
pretrial hearing that the defendant's presence would embarrass and intimidate the victim, and
-that the videotape procedures would enable the victim to testify more clearly and accurately.
Id. at -,
554 A.2d at 283-84. Finding that the defendant's presence would be detrimental
to both the child victim's emotional well-being and ability to testify accurately, the trial court
granted the State's motion to videotape the victim's testimony. Id. at -, 554 A.2d at 284.
The trial court reasoned that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
State's need to videotape the child victim's testimony was compelling. Id. Prior to trial the
State recorded the victim's testimony in a room outside of the courtroom and outside of the
defendant's presence. Id. at -, 554 A.2d at 279.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the court in Bonello held that a
defendant's right to physical confrontation is not absolute. Id. at __
, 554 A.2d at 281.
Instead, the Bonello court concluded that in Coy v. Iowa the Supreme Court indicated that a
state may use protective trial procedures that abrogate a defendant's right to face adverse
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Maryland Court of Appeals in Craigcorrectly concluded that Coy's emphasis
on the truthfinding process in criminal trials suggests that a state's interest
in presenting the testimony of an otherwise unavailable child witness constitutes the important public policy necessary to override a defendant's right
to physical confrontation.'I Because the state statute at issue in Craig
required that a trial court make a case-specific finding that the state's use
of one-way closed-circuit television was necessary, the Maryland Court of
129
Appeals correctly held that the statute was constitutional.
In Craig, however, the court of appeals also properly concluded that
the trial court erroneously allowed the State to invoke the Maryland statute

witnesses upon a case-specific finding that the state's use of such procedures is necessary to
further an important public policy. Id.; see Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801-03 (1988)
(indicating that state constitutionally may abridge defendant's confrontation rights upon casespecific finding of necessity); id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same). In Bonello,
therefore, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether the state's interest in preserving
the accuracy and trustworthiness of the alleged child abuse victim's testimony constituted the
important public policy necessary to override the defendant's confrontation rights. Bonello,
210 Conn. at -, 554 A.2d at 182-82. The Bonello court concluded that the Coy decision
indicated that the state's interest in the reliability of the child witness' testimony outweighed
the defendant's right to physical confrontation. Id. The Bonello court reasoned that in Coy
the Surpeme Court emphasized that the right to physical confrontation is important because
physical confrontation enhances the truthfinding process in criminal trials. Id.; see Coy, 108
S. Ct. at 2801-03 (emphasizing importance of confrontation rights to accurate factfinding at
criminal trials). In Bonello, however, the state supreme court determined that if the defendant's
presence will be detrimental to a child witness' ability to testify accurately, the defendant's
presence will undermine the truthfinding process. Bonello, 210 Conn. at -,
554 A.2d at
281 82. The Connecticut Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that, under Coy v. Iowa, the
state's interest in preserving the accuracy of the child witness' testimony outweighed the
defendant's right to physical confrontation. Id. Accordingly, the Bonello court held that the
State did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights by videotaping the alleged victim's
testimony outside the presence of the defendant. Id.; see Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801-03 (indicating
that state's interest in presenting accurate testimony overrides defendant's confrontation rights).
128. See Craig, 316 Md. at -,
560 A.2d at 1125-26 (holding that state's interest in
procuring child witness' testimony overrides defendant's right to physical confrontation); Coy,
108 S. Ct. at 2801-03 (indicating that state's interest in procuring testimony of otherwise
unavailable witness is important public policy and may override defendant's right to physical
confrontation); supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing that Craig court of
appeals properly held that state's interest in presenting testimony of otherwise unavailable
witness outweighed defendant's interest in right to physical confrontation).
129. See Craig, 326 Md. at __
, 560 A.2d at 1121 (holding that Maryland statute
authorizing state's use of one-way closed-circuit television is constitutional); supra notes 12228 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of Maryland Court of Appeals' holding in
Craigthat statute providing for state's use of one-way closed-circuit television is constitutional);
MD. CTs. & JUrD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1986) (providing for state's use
of one-way closed-circuit television upon trial court's case-specific finding of necessity); Coy
v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (indicating that if statute providing for protective trial
procedures requires that court make case-specific finding that state's abridgement of defendant's
confrontation rights is necessary, statute is constitutional); id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (same); supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing that state constitutionally may abrogate defendant's right to physical confrontation upon case-specific finding
of necessity).
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and present the child witnesses' testimony through one-way closed-circuit
television.' a0 The court of appeals correctly observed that, under the Maryland statute, the state's separation of the defendant from a child witness
during the child's testimony is necessary only if a face-to-face encounter
with the defendant will cause the child to suffer severe emotional distress
to the extent that the child will be unavailable to testify at trial.' 3' As the
court of appeals apparently reasoned, the state has no legitimate reason to
separate a defendant from a testifying witness if the defendant's presence
has no traumatizing effect on the witness.132 Accordingly, because the State
in Craig failed to show that the defendant's presence would cause the child
witnesses to suffer such severe emotional distress that the witnesses would
be unavailable to testify, the Maryland Court of Appeals properly held that
the State's use of one-way closed-circuit television was unnecessary and,
1 33
therefore, violated the defendant's confrontation rights.
In contrast to the Maryland Court of Appeals' determination in Craig
that a defendant's right to physical confrontation may give way to countervailing interests, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded
in Bergstrom that under the Massachusetts constitution the Commonwealth
never may utilize protective trial procedures that provide for a witness'
presentation of testimony outside the physical presence of the defendant. 34
Unlike the court in Craig, the court in Bergstrom found that the legislature

130. See Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1128-29 (holding that state's use of oneway closed-circuit television in Craig violated defendant's confrontation rights); supra notes
74-80 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Craig that
trial court improperly allowed state to invoke Maryland statute and present child witness'
testimony via closed-circuit television).
131. See Craig, 326 Md. at __ , 560 A.2d at 1126-27 (holding that state may invoke
statute authorizing state's use of closed-circuit television only if defendant's presence will cause
child witness to suffer emotional distress and, consequently, be unavailable to testify); MD.
CTS. & JUO. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1986) (authorizing state to use closed-circuit
television if, by testifying in the courtroom, child witness will be unable to communicate);
supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing Craig Court of Appeals' interpretation
of statute authorizing state's use of closed-circuit television).
132. See Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1126-27 (holding that defendant's presence
must be operative condition causing child witness' unavailability); supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text (discussing Maryland Court of Appeals' holding in Craig that state may
use closed-circuit television only if defendant's presence is primary cause of witness' unavailability); supra note 77 (citing state cases holding that state may not use protective trial
procedure that abridge defendant's right to face adverse witness unless defendant's presence
has traumatizing effect on witness).
133. See Craig, 316 Md. at __ , 560 A.2d at 1127-29 (holding that in Craig state's use
of one-way closed-circuit television violated defendant's right of confrontation); supra notes
76-80 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland Court of Appeals' holding in Craig that
state's use of closed-circuit television unconstitutionally impinged upon defendant's confrontation rights).
134. See Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 283-87 (holding that defendant's confrontation rights are not absolute); Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534,
-, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371-74
(Mass. 1988) (holding that state never may use closed-circuit television to record witness'
testimony outside defendant's presence).
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could not abrogate a defendant's right to physical confrontation by determining that a certain class of witnesses, child abuse victims, deserve special
treatment. 35 The Bergstrom court apparently concluded that the Commonwealth's interest in protecting child abuse victims did not constitute the
important state interest necessary to override a defendant's right under the
Massachusetts constitution to a face-to-face encounter with adverse wit36
nesses.'
Although the Massachusetts court's decision in Bergstrom conflicts with
the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Craig, the two cases differ in
one significant respect. 37 The state statute at issue in Craig provided for
the State's use of closed-circuit television upon the State's demonstration
that absent protective trial procedures a child witness will suffer severe
emotional trauma and, therefore, be unable to communicate at trial. 3 In
Craig the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that the State's showing
that a child witness would be unable to testify in court tantamount to the
State's demonstration of unavailability and, therefore, would necessitate the
State's use of closed-circuit television.3 9 The Commonwealth statute at issue
in Bergstrom, however, authorized the Commonwealth to record a child
witness' testimony outside the presence of the defendant if a face-to-face

135. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
136. See id. at
, 524 N.E.2d at 373-74 (indicating that defendant's interest in physically
confronting adverse witnesses outweighs state's interest in protecting child witnesses' emotional
well-being). In Bergstrom the Massachusetts Appellate Court determined that, although a
defendant's confrontation rights are not absolute, a defendant's right physically to confront
witnesses is paramount except in limited circumstances. Id. Accordingly, in concluding that
the Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television, pursuant to the Massachusetts statute,
violated the defendant's confrontation rights, the Bergstrom court determined that the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the child witnesses from emotional harm did not present a
circumstance in which the Commonwealth constitutionally could abrogate a defendant's right
physically to confront witnesses. Id. The Bergstrom court, therefore, implicitly held that the
Commonwealth's interest in protecting a child witness' emotional well-being does not outweigh
a defendant's tight to a face-to-face encounter with adverse witnesses. Id.
137. See Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 374 (holding that Massachusetts
statute that authorized commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television unconstitutionally
distinguished between child abuse victims and other classes of witnesses); compare Craig, 316
Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1125-26 (holding that Maryland statute that authorized state's use
of closed-circuit television in certain child abuse cases was constitutional).
138. See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1986) (providing
that state may use closed-circuit television if trial court finds that child witness will be unable
to communicate in court).
139. See Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1125-26 (holding that state's demonstration
that child witness will be unable to communicate in court tantamount to showing of unavailability and, thereby, necessitating state's use of closed-circuit television); id. (relying on
Maryland Court of Appeals' holding in Wildermuth v. State to conclude that statute authorizes
state's use of closed-circuit television upon case-specific finding of witness' unavailability);
Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. at 515, 530 A.2d 284 (holding that Maryland statutes allows
state to present otherwise unavailable witness' testimony via closed-circuit television); supra
notes 70-73 (discussing Craig court of appeals' decision that Maryland statute provides for
state's use of closed-circuit television upon case-specific finding that without state's use of
closed-circuit television child witness will be unavailable to testify).
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encounter with the defendant would cause the child emotional harm.140
Unlike the Maryland statute in Craig, therefore, the Massachusetts statute

in Bergstrom provided for the Commonwealth's use of one-way closedcircuit television solely to further the Commonwealth's interest in protecting
an alleged child abuse victim's emotional well-being.' 4' Accordingly, although the Craig court determined that the State's interest in presenting an

otherwise unavailable witness' testimony outweighed the defendant's right
physically to confront adverse witnesses, the Bergstrom court concluded that

the Commonwealth's interest in protecting a child witness from the emotional harm accompanying a face-to-face encounter with the defendant did
not outweigh the defendant's right to physical confrontation. 42
Although the Massachusetts court decided Bergstrom prior to the Su-

preme Court's holding in Coy v. Iowa, Coy does not compel the Bergstrom
court's conclusions. 43 Nothing in the Coy decision indicates that a state's

140. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(1)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (providing
for commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television if trial court finds that child witness may
suffer emotional trauma resulting from in court testimony); see also Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at
- 524 N.E.2d at 373-74 (concluding that Massachusetts statute authorizing commonwealth's
use of closed-circuit television violated defendant's confrontation rights); supra notes 102-08,
134-36 and accompanying text (discussing Bergstrom court's conclusion that Commonwealth's
use of closed-circuit television, pursuant to the Massachusetts statute, violated the defendant's
confrontation rights).
141. Id.; compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1986)
(providing for state's use of closed circuit television if state demonstrates that child witness
will be unable to communicate in court and, therefore, unavailable to testify at trial) with
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(1)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (providing for commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television if commonwealth demonstrates that child witness will
suffer emotional trauma from in court testimony).
142. Compare Craig, 316 Md. at -,
560 A.2d at 1125-26 (holding that state's interest
presenting otherwise unavailable witness' testimony may justify state's use of closed-circuit
television) with Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 373-74 (holding that Commonwealth's interest in protecting child witness' emotional health did not justify Commonwealth's
use of closed-circuit television). Because the Bergstrom court found that the Commonwealth
ordinarily may not abrogate a defendant's right to physical confrontation unless the Commonwealth can demonstrate that a witness is unavailable to testify at trial, arguably, the
Bergstrom court would have upheld the Massachusetts statute if the statute, like the Maryland
statute in Craig, had required that the Commonwealth demonstrate that the child witnesses
would have been unable to communicate in court. Id.; see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1986) (providing that state may use closed-circuit television if
state demonstrates that child witness will be unable to testify in court). The Bergstrom court,
like the Craigcourt of appeals, might have considered the Commonwealth's showing that the
child witness would be unable to testify in court tantamount to a showing of unavailability.
See Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at
-, 524 N.E.2d at 373 (observing that commonwealth may
abrogate defendant's confrontation rights if commonwealth can demonstrate that witness is
unavailable to testify at trial); Craig, 316 Md. at __
, 560 A.2d at 1125-26 (finding state's
showing that child witness would be unable to communicate at trial tantamount to showing
of unavailability).
143. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803-05 (1988) (indicating that statutes which authorize
state's use of closed-circuit television may pass constitutional muster); Bergstrom, 402 Mass.
524 N.E.2d 3663, 372-74 (Mass. 1988) (finding that Massachusetts statute in Bergstrom
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interest in protecting child sexual abuse victims from emotional harm would
constitute insufficient grounds for the State's infringement of a defendant's

right to physical confrontation with adverse witnesses. 14 Instead, Coy indicates that a state statute that authorizes a state's use of closed-circuit

television to present a witness's testimony would pass constitutional muster
if the statute requires that a trial court make a case-specific finding that
the protective trial procedures are necessary to further an important state

interest. 45 Moreover, Justice O'Connor, concurring in Coy, specifically
noted that a state's interest in protecting an alleged child abuse victim's
emotional well-being would constitute the sort of important state interest
necessary to override a defendant's right to physical confrontation. 46 The
Coy decision, therefore, does not implicate the constitutionality of a statute
that provides for the state's use of one-way closed-circuit television if the

statute requires that the state demonstrate that the state's presentation of
televised testimony is necessary to protect a particular child witness from
the emotional or psychological trauma accompanying a physical encounter
with the defendant. 47
In accordance with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Coy,
the Massachusetts statute at issue in Bergstrom provided for the Common-

wealth's use of closed-circuit television only upon a trial court's case-specific
finding of necessity.14s The Massachusetts statute authorized the state to
record a child witness' testimony outside the presence of the defendant only
if a face-to-face encounter with the defendant would cause the child to

suffer emotional trauma. 49 Moreover, the Massachusetts statute expressly
prohibited the Commonwealth from recording a child witness' testimony
violated defendant's confrontation rights); supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing
that Supreme Court in Coy suggests that state constitutionally may use protective trial
procedures in appropriate cases).
144. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (observing that majority decision in Coy did not
determine that state's interest in protecting child abuse victims never could outweigh defendant's
right physically to confront adverse witnesses); id. at 2803-05 (same).
145. See id. (indicating that statute which authorizes state's use of protective trial procedures upon trial court's individualized determination of necessity would be constitutional);
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing Coy decision, which suggests that state's
use of protective trial procedures may in appropriate cases survive constitutional scrutiny).
146. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 27-33 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Coy).
147. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (indicating that state constitutionally may use protective
trial procedures that abrogate accused's confrontation rights if state demonstrates that protective
trial procedures are necessary to protect witness from emotional harm); supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text (discussing that state constitutionally may use protective trial procedures
upon case-specific finding that protective trial procedures are necessary to protect child witness).
148. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(1)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring
that trial court make case-specific finding that commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television
is necessary to protect child witness from emotional harm); Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801-03
(indicating that state constitutionally may abrogate defendant's confrontation rights upon casespecific finding of necessity); id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
149. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(1)(b)(1) (authorizing Commonwealth's
use of one-way closed-circuit television if defendant's presence will traumatize child witness).
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outside the presence of the defendant unless the defendant's presence would

be the operative condition causing the child to suffer emotional trauma. 150
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Coy does not compel the

Bergstrom court's conclusion that the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional.' 5' Furthermore, the Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television

in Bergstrom did not unconstitutionally impinge upon the defendant's
confrontation rights. 5 2 Pursuant to the Massachusetts statute and in accordance with Coy, the trial court in Bergstrom determined that a face-to-face
encounter with the defendant would cause the child witnesses to suffer

emotional harm. 53 Accordingly, in Bergstrom the trial court made a case-

specific finding that the Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television to
record the child witnesses' testimony outside the presence of the defendant
54
was necessary, and, therefore, constitutionally permissible.
In Coy v. Iowa the Supreme Court of the United States held that the

State's placement of a screen between the defendant and the child witnesses
to block the defendant from the witnesses' view violated the confrontation

clause of the sixth amendment.

55

Although holding that the Iowa statute

that authorized the State's use of the screen was an obvious violation of

the defendant's sixth amendment right to a face-to-face confrontation with
adverse witnesses, the Supreme Court in Coy did not foreclose the possibility

that a statute which provides for a state's use of certain procedural devices
to shield a child witness from emotional trauma or to present an otherwise
unavailable witness' testimony may pass constitutional muster. 56 Instead,

150. Id. at § 16D(1)(b)(3).

151. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988) (indicating that state's use of protective trial
procedures upon case-specific finding of necessity would be constitutional); id. at 2803-05
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 373-74
(holding that Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television, pursuant to Massachusetts
statute, violated the defendant's confrontation rights); supra notes 35-36, 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing that states constitutionally may use one-way closed-circuit television
in appropriate cases).
152. See Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 373-74 (holding that state's use
of one-way closed-circuit television violated defendant's confrontation rights); supra notes 98104, 148-151 and accompanying text (discussing Bergstrom court's conclusion that Commonwealth's use of closed-circuit television was unconstitutional).
153. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 369; see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
278, § 16D(l)(b)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing Commonwealth to record child witness'
testimony outside defendant's presence if defendant's presence will traumatize child).
154. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 369; see Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803
(indicating that state may abrogate defendant's right to physical confrontation upon casespecific finding of necessity); id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); supra notes
35-36, 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing that state may abridge confrontation rights
upon case-specific finding of necessity).
155. Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988); see supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's decision in Coy).
156. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802-03; see id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that Coy majority did not foreclose state's use of protective trial procedures in appropriate
cases); supra notes 35-36, 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing that Coy decision did
not foreclose state's use of protective trial procedures in appropriate cases).
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the Coy decision suggests that, if a statute that allows the state to present
a witness' testimony via closed-circuit television requires that a trial court

make an individualized determination that a particular witness requires
protective trial procedures, a state constitutionally may abrogate a defendant's right to a physical confrontation with adverse witnesses.1 7 Accordingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Craig v. State correctly held that
the Maryland statute that authorized the State's use of closed-circuit tele-

vision to present the child witness' testimony was constitutional. 5 8 In Craig,
however, the Maryland Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the State
failed to demonstrate that a face-to-face encounter with the defendant would
have caused the child witnesses such severe emotional distress that the
children would have been unavailable to testify at trial.'59 Accordingly,
because in Craig the State failed to demonstrate that it was necessary to

record the child witnesses' testimony outside the presence of the defendant
via closed-circuit television, the court of appeals properly held that the trial
court erroneously allowed the State to invoke the Maryland statute and
abrogate the defendant's right to physical confrontation. 6 0 In Commonwealth v. Bergstrom the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that

because the Commonwealth's interest in protecting alleged child abuse
victims from emotional harm did not outweigh a defendant's right physically
to confront adverse witnesses, the Massachusetts statute that authorized the
Commonwealth to record the child witnesses' testimony outside the presence

of the accused was unconstitutional.' 6' The Supreme Court's decision in
Coy does not compel the Bergstrom Court's conclusion. 62 Instead, the Coy
holding suggests that, should a statute require that a trial court make an

157. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (indicating that Court would uphold constitutionality
of statute that provides for state's use of protective trial procedures if statute requires casespecific finding of necessity); supra notes 35-36, 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing
Coy decision, which suggests that statute requiring case-specific finding of necessity would be
constitutional).
158. See Craig, 316 Md. 551,
-, 560 A.2d 1120, 1121 (1988) (holding that Maryland
statute authorizing state's use of closed-circuit television in certain child sexual abuse cases is
constitutional); supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of Craigcourt
of appeals' conclusion that Maryland statute was constitutional).
159. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1127-29 (holding that state's use of closedcircuit television violated defendant's confrontation rights); supra notes 74-80, 130-33 and
accompanying text (discussing court of appeals' decision in Craig that state's use of closedcircuit television was unconstitutional).
160. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1127-29 (holding that trial court improperly
allowed state to invoke Maryland statute and present witnesses' testimony via closed-circuit
television); see supra notes 74-80, 130-133 and accompanying text (discussing Craig court of
appeals' decision that trial court erroneously allowed state to present witnesses' testimony
through one-way closed-circuit television).
161. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534,
-, 524 N.E.2d 366, 373-74 (Mass. 1988).
162. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801-03 (1988) (indicating that state's interest in protecting
child abuse victims from emotional harm may override defendant's confrontation rights); id.
at 3803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); supra notes 35-36, 119-122, 143-147 and
accompanying text (discussing that state's interest in protecting child abuse victims' emotional
well-being may outweigh defendant's confrontation rights).
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individualized determination that a child witness' emotional well-being or
availability to testify necessitates the state's use of one-way closed-circuit
television, the statute will be constitutional. 163 Accordingly, state statutes
that authorize a state to record an alleged child abuse victim's testimony
outside the presence of the defendant upon a case-specific finding of
necessity should survive scrutiny under the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment.'6
KAREN

E.

HAVENS

163. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (suggesting that statute which provides for case-specific
finding that state's use of protective trial procedures is necessary would be constitutional); id.
at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); supra notes 35-36, 119-122 and accompanying
text (discussing that state statutes which provide for individualized determination that protective
trial procedures are necessary are constitutional).
164. See supra notes 35-36, 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing that statutes which
provide for state's use of closed-circuit television upon case-specific finding that child victim,
by testifying in open court, will suffer emotional or psychological harm would pass constitutional muster).

